A basic concept in network analysis is centrality, which measures the importance of nodes in a network. It is well known that formulations based solely on static network structures -such as degrees, local sphere-of-influences, and betweenness -may not sufficiently capture the underlying centrality of various applications. In this research, we address the following fundamental question: "Given a social network, what is the impact of influence models on network centrality?" Social influence is commonly formulated as a stochastic process, which defines how each group of nodes can collectively influence other nodes in an underlying graph. This process defines a natural cooperative game, in which each group's utility is its influence spread 1 . Thus, fundamental game-theoretical concepts of this social-influence game can be instrumental in understanding network influence.
INTRODUCTION
Graphs are widely used for defining the structure of social and information networks. In network science, the use of graphs stretches beyond network representation. Fundamental concepts and fast algorithms from graph theory have provided valuable mathematical and algorithmic tools for understanding network interactions and network phenomena. However:
• Real-world network data is much richer than the graph-theoretical representation: a social network is not just a weighted graph. Likewise, the Web and Twitter are more than directed graphs.
• Network interactions and phenomena are more complex than what can be captured by nodes and edges.
Network influence is a wonderful such example. As envisioned by Domingos and Richardson [21, 10] , and beautifully formulated by Kempe, Kleinberg, and Tardos [13] , social-influence propagation can be viewed as a (stochastic) dynamic process over an underlying directed graph: After a group of nodes becomes active, these seed nodes propagate their influence through the graph structure. Social influence is a fundamental problem, which connects network science with business and social sciences. Even when the graph structure of a social network is fixed, phenomena such as the spread of ideas, epidemics, and technological innovations can follow different processes. In this fundamental problem, the graph that underlies the social network captures its static structure (e.g., connectivity). In contrast, the social-influence model reflects the dynamic influence process. This network phenomena is thus defined by the interplay between the social-influence process and the underlying network structure. To gain insight into social influence, we need to understand not just the network structure, but also, crucially, its interaction with the influence process. This basic network problem illustrates that network science needs to and has gone beyond traditional graph theory.
A social-influence instance specifies a directed graph G = (V, E) and an influence model PI (see Section 2) For each S ⊆ V , PI defines a stochastic influence process with S as the initial active set, which activates a random set I(S) ⊇ S with probability PI(S, I(S)). Then, σ(S) = E[|I(S)|] is the influence spread of S. The question above can be restated as: Given a graph G = (V, E) and an influence model PI, how should we characterize the centrality of nodes in V ?
For illustration, consider the following simple base case: Suppose Alice can influence Bob with probability p, and Bob can influence Alice with probability q. Then, what should be the ratio of their centrality?
A Game-Theoretical Approach to Centrality We will consider the game-theoretical approach of Grofman and Owen [12] , which analyzes an n-node network by: (1) formulating an n-person network game, and (2) applying Game Theory to formulate centrality. Their original work focused on voting games and Penrose-Banzhaf power index [4] . Gómez et al. [11] then applied this approach using cooperative network games and their Shapley values [22] .
Mathematically, an n-person cooperative game is defined by a characteristic utility function τ : 2 V → R, where V = [n] [22] . In this game, the Shapley value φ where Sπ,v denotes the set of players preceding v in a random permutation π of V . The Shapley value is widely considered to be the fairest measure of a player's power index in a cooperative game. The work of [11] was further extended in [23, 17, 14, 1, 24] . In particular, Michalak et al. [14] formulated five network games whose characteristic functions are based on the "static sphere-of-influence" of each group.
Our Contributions
We present a comprehensive analysis of the effectiveness of the game-theoretical approach in addressing the impact of influence models on centrality. In this paper, we will focus on the Shapley value of the most natural cooperative game associated with network influence. In this cooperative social-influence game, the network structure and influence process together define a natural characteristic utility for each group of nodes, namely, the group's influence spread. Thus, influence models in [21, 10, 13] can be viewed as a family of succinctly-represented n-person social-influence games.
Results
Network analysis is not just a mathematical task, but also a computational task. In the age of Big Data, networks are massive. Thus, an effective solution concept in network science should be both mathematically meaningful and algorithmically efficient. In our analysis, we will address both the conceptual and algorithmic questions.
Algorithmic Results: Scalable Methods
Computing Shapley values appeared to be a difficult problem: (1) Defined over n! permutations, Shapley value computation can be #P-complete for simple cooperative games [9] . (2) Exact computation of influence spread in the basic independent cascade and linear-threshold models is #P-complete [28, 8] . (3) The best algorithms for computing the Shapley value of several network games with "static sphereof-influences" have quadratic or cubic time complexity [14] .
Facing these perceived challenges, in Section 3, we will give a provably-good scalable algorithm for approximating the Shapley values of a large family of social-influence instances. Our algorithm expands upon techniques from the recent algorithmic breakthroughs in influence maximization [6, 27] . Among our algorithmic contributions is a key mathematical identity, which -we believe -is interesting on its own right. Like in [6, 27] , we apply the reversed influence process to construct a reverse reachable set. Instrumental to our algorithm and analysis, we prove that this elegant structure of influence models can be used to build an unbiased and robust estimator of the Shapley value. Our method appears to be quite general, and can be extended to weighted influence models in which nodes have different weights. We believe this is a potentially important algorithmic result for applying Game Theory to study network influence. It provides an algorithmic tool for conducting game-theoretical studies of large-scale social-network influence models.
Conceptual Results: Axiomatic Characterization
Our next result addresses the conceptual question: "What does the Shapley value of the social-influence game capture?" Network centrality is a formulation of "dimensional reduction" from "high dimensional" network data to "low dimensional" centrality measures. Through this lens, the socialinfluence Shapley value is an aggregation of network data, consisting of both the static network structure and the dynamic influence model. Other aggregation methods are also intuitively reasonable. For example, one can rank nodes by their own influence spread, by Shapley values of other network games [14] , or by influence-independent centrality such as degrees, PageRank or betweenness. The dimensional reduction of data is a challenging process, because inevitably, some information will be lost. As highlighted by Arrow's celebrated impossibility theorem on voting [3] , for various (desirable) properties, conforming dimensionalreduction scheme may not even exist. Thus, it is important to characterize what is captured by each centrality measure.
Axiomatization is an instrumental approach for such characterization. Inspired by social choice theory [3] , and particularly by [20] (on measures of intellectual influence), and [2] (on PageRank), we have developed a (descriptive) axiomatic framework for understanding network centrality in the context of network influence. In Section 4, we present an axiomatic characterization which captures the essence of using the Shapley value of the social-influence game as centrality measures. In particular, we postulate a set of natural and desirable centrality axioms that captures the impact of influence models. We establish the soundness and completeness of our axiomatic characterization by proving that the social-influence Shapley value is the unique centrality measure consistent with these axioms.
This representation theorem also establishes the following appealing property: Our axioms characterize centrality based on the probabilistic distribution of the social-influence process. Remarkably, the centrality measure satisfying these axioms is in fact fully characterized by the influence-spread profile of the influence model. We find this amazing because the distribution profile of an influence model has much higher dimensionality than its influence-spread profile.
Empirical Results
Together, the axiomatic and algorithmic characterization provides a comparative analysis of different centrality formulations of influence models. While the axiomatic characterization sheds light on the mathematical difference between Shapley centrality and other centrality formulations, our scalable algorithm enables us to conduct large-scale experiments to empirically study the social-influence Shapley centrality, which we will discuss in details in Section 5.
For presentation clarity, we move the technical proofs into the appendix, which also contains additional technical materials for spread-based axiomatization, and (algorithmic and axiomatic) generalization to weighted influence models.
PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we review three basic concepts central to this paper: (1) social-influence models, (2) influence spread, and (3) the Shapley value of a cooperative game.
Social Influence Models
A network-influence instance is specified by a triple I = (V, E, PI), where G = (V, E) is a directed graph, representing the structure of a social network, and PI defines the influence model [13] . We first review the classical independent cascade (IC) model, in which each directed edge (u, v) ∈ E has an influence probability pu,v ∈ [0, 1]. We now use IC, which is a discrete-time influence model, to illustrate social-influence processes when given a seed set S: At time 0, nodes in S are activated while other nodes are inactive. At time t ≥ 1, for any node u activated at time t − 1, it has one chance to activate each of its inactive out-neighbor v with an independent probability of pu,v. When there is no more activation, this stochastic process ends with a random set I(S) of nodes activated during the process. The influence spread of S is σ(S) = E[|I(S)|], the expected number of nodes influenced by S. As a convention, henceforth we use boldface symbols to represent random variables.
Algorithmically, we will focus on the (random) triggering model. This general influence model of Kempe-KleinbergTardos [13] contains several classical influence modelssuch as IC and another popular one, the linear threshold -as special cases. In this model, each v ∈ V has a random triggering set T (v), drawn from a distribution -defined by the influence model -over the power set of all in-neighbors of v. At time t = 0, triggering sets {T (v)}v∈V are drawn independently, and the seed set S is activated. At t ≥ 1, if v is not active, it becomes activated if some u ∈ T (v) is activated at time t − 1. The influence spread of S is σ(S) = E[|I(S)|], where I(S) denotes the random set activated by S. IC is the triggering model that: For each directed edge (u, v) ∈ E, add u to T (v) with a probability of pu,v.
The triggering model is a generative model of subgraphs in G: (1) Draw independent random triggering sets {T (v)}v∈V . (2) For each (u, v) ∈ E, call (u, v) a live edge if u ∈ T (v). We will refer to the random graph, L = (V, {(u, v) : (u, v) is a live edge}), as the live-edge graph.
We say a set function f (·) is monotone if f (S) ≤ f (T ) whenever S ⊆ T , and submodular if f (S ∪ {v}) − f (S) ≥ f (T ∪ {v}) − f (T ) whenever S ⊆ T and v ∈ T . For any subgraph L of G and S ⊆ V , let Γ(L, S) be the set of nodes in L reachable from set S. Then,
As shown in [13] , in any triggering model, σ(·) is monotone and submodular, because |Γ(L, S)| is monotone and submodular for any graph L.
Cooperative Games and Shapley Value
An n-person cooperative game over V = [n] is specified by a characteristic function τ : 2 V → R, where for any coalition S ⊆ V , τ (S) denotes the cooperative utility of S. A fundamental solution concept of cooperative game theory is the Shapley value, which maps any characteristic function τ to a vector in R n [22] . Let Π be the set of all permutations of V . For any v ∈ V and π ∈ Π, let Sπ,v denote the set of nodes in V preceding v in permutation π. Then, ∀v ∈ V :
We use π ∼ Π to denote that π be a random permutation uniformly drawn from Π. Then:
In other words, the Shapley value of v is v's marginal contribution over the set preceding v in a random permutation. In cooperative game theory, a ranking function φ is a mapping from a characteristic function τ to a real-valued function over V . Shapley [22] proved a remarkable representation theorem: The Shapley value is the unique ranking function that satisfies all the following four conditions: (1) Efficiency:
For any two characteristic functions τ and ω, for any α, β > 0, φ(ατ + βω) = αφ(τ ) + βφ(ω).
Efficiency states that the total utility is fully distributed. Symmetry states that two players' ranking values should be the same if they have the identical marginal utility profile. Linearity states that the ranking values of the weighted sum of two cooperative games is the same as the weighted sum of their ranking values. Null Player states that a player's ranking value should be zero if the player has zero marginal utility to every subset. spread function σ defined by a triggering model over a social network G = (V, E). To precisely state our result, we will make the following general computational assumption:
Definition 1 (Computational Triggering Model).
The time complexity for drawing a random triggering set T (v) is proportional to the in-degree of v. This computational triggering model includes IC and linear threshold models as special cases. Thus, our algorithm is applicable to these classical models. In this section, since we focus on the Shapley value as the ranking function, we will use φ in place of φ Shapley . The key combinatorial structures that we will use are random sets generated by the following reversed diffusion process of the triggering model.
Definition 2 (Random RR Sets).
A random reverse reachable (RR) set R is generated as follows: (0) Initially, R = ∅. (1) Select a node v ∼ V , uniformly at random, and add v (called the root of R) to R. (2) Repeat the following process until every node in R has a triggering set: For every u ∈ R not yet having a triggering set, draw its random triggering set T (u), and add the set to R.
Step (1). The reversed diffusion process uses v as the seed, and follows the incoming edges instead of the outgoing edges to iteratively "influence" triggering sets. Given a fixed set R ⊆ V , let the width of R, denoted ω(R), be the total in-degrees of nodes in R. By Definition 1, the time complexity to generate the random RR set R is O(ω(R)). The expected time complexity to generate a random RR set is E[ω(R)]. As for influence maximization [6, 27] , we will use this reversed diffusion process to to approximate the social-influence Shapley value.
Our scalable algorithm uses the following key technical lemma, which elegantly connects RR sets with Shapley values. Let I{E} be the indicator function for event E.
Lemma 1 (Shapley Value Identity). Let R be a random RR set. Then, ∀u ∈ V , u's Shapley value is:
This lemma is instrumental to our scalable algorithm. It guarantees that we can use random RR sets to build unbiased estimators of social-influence Shapley values. Our algorithm ASV-RR (standing for "Approximate Shapley Value by random RR Set") is presented in Algorithm 1. In Phase 1, Algorithm 1 estimates the number of RR sets needed in the Shapley estimator. In particular, it aims for a good lower bound of σ * 1 = maxv∈V σ(v). Line 2 is a baseline method, which approximates the average width of random RR sets. Its bound is in fact sufficient for the asymptotic-time analysis of our algorithm. In practice, we use an additional tighter estimate to improve the performance of our algorithm. We use the influence spread of the node with the highest degree, and incorporate this step explicitly into line 3. Its estimate b appears in line 4 for setting θ. In discussion below, let n = |V | and m = |E|. The following theorem summarizes the performance of our scalable Algorithm 1.
Theorem 1 (Accuracy and Scalability of ASV-RR).
Let φ be the Shapley value of influence-spread σ. For any > 0 and ∈ (0, 1] and m ≥ 2, Algorithm ASV-RR returns an estimated Shapley valueφ v such that (a)φ v is unbiased: for every u ∈ R, estu = estu + 1/|R| 10: end for
where σ * 1 = maxv∈V σ({v}). Under Definition 1, with probability at least 1 − 1 n , the running time of ASV-RR is O( (m + n) log n/ε 2 ); when ≥ 1, the expected running time of ASV-RR is O( (m + n) log n/ε 2 ).
The proofs of Lemma 1 and Theorem 1 are presented in Appendix A. Here, we give a high-level analysis. In the triggering model, as for influence maximization [6, 27, 26] , a random RR set R can be equivalently obtained by first generating a random live-edge graph L, and then constructing R as the set of nodes that can reach a random v ∼ V in L. The fundamental mathematical equation associated with this live-edge graph process is:
Our Lemma 1 is the result of the following crucial observations: The Shapley value φu(σ) of a given node u ∈ V can be equivalently formulated as the expected Shapley value over all live-edge graphs and random choices of root v. The chief advantage of this formulation is that it localizes the contribution of marginal influences: On a fixed live-graph L and root v ∈ V , we only need to compute the marginal influence of u in terms of activating v to obtain the Shapley contribution of the pair. We don't need to compute the marginal influences of u for activating other nodes. Lemma 1 then follows from our second crucial observation. When R is the fixed set that can reach v in L, the marginal influence of u activating v is 1 if and only if the following two conditions hold concurrently: (a) u is in R, and (b) u is ordered before any other node in R. By the definition of the influence process, on one hand, if u ∈ R, then u cannot activate v; on the other hand, if u ∈ R but u is ordered after some other node w ∈ R, then w already activates v, meaning that u's marginal influence to v is still 0. In addition, in a random permutation π ∼ Π over V , the probability that u ∈ R is ordered first in R is exactly 1/|R|. This explains the contribution of I{u ∈ R}/|R| in Lemma 1, which is also precisely what the update in line 9 of Algorithm 1 does. Together, these two observations establish the "Shapley Value Identity" of Lemma 1, which is the basis for the unbiased estimator of u's Shapley value. Then, by careful probabilistic analysis, we can bound the number of random RR sets needed to achieve approximation accuracy stated in Theorem 1 and establish the scalability for Algorithm ASV-RR.
AXIOMATIC CHARACTERIZATION OF CENTRALITY AND INFLUENCE
In network analysis, centrality reflects nodes' significance in a network. As discussed in Section 1, each centrality measure -such as PageRank and betweenness -captures certain static and/or dynamic aspects of network data. In this section, we will focus on the following question:
What does the Shapley value of the cooperative social-influence game reflect?
We will present an axiomatic characterization of the social-influence Shapley value to identify its essence in capturing the impact of influence models on network centrality.
Axioms: Centrality in Network Influence
We first give a distributional view of social-influence models. Mathematically, an influence instance is a triple I = (V, E, PI), where G = (V, E) represents the underlying network, and PI : 2 V × 2 V → R provides the probabilistic details of the influence model: PI(S, T ) denotes the probability that a seed set S ⊆ V can activate T ⊆ V under I. In other words, if II(S) denotes the random set activated by seed set S, then Pr(II(S) = T ) = PI(S, T ). This probability distribution is commonly defined by a succinct influence model [13] . Following the triggering model, we also require that: (a) PI(∅, ∅) = 1, PI(∅, T ) = 0, ∀T = ∅, and (b) if S ⊆ T then PI(S, T ) = 0, i.e., S always activates itself (S ⊆ II(S)). The influence spread of S is then given by:
Definition 3 (Centrality Measure). A centrality measure ψ is a mapping from a social-influence instance I = (V, E, PI) to a real vector (ψv(I))v∈V ∈ R |V | .
In contrast to Definition 3, the Shapley value of the influence game is a mapping from the spread function σ(I) to a real vector. Thus, ψ is more generally formulated. It can capture the influence model beyond its spread function. We use different symbols for them to highlight this difference. Inspired by [3, 20, 2] , we postulate a set of axioms that a desirable centrality measure ψ should satisfy in order to capture the impact of influence models on network centrality. The first axiom is straightforward -it states that labels should have no effect on centrality measures. Axiom 1 (Anonymity). For any influence instance I = (V, E, PI), and permutation π ∈ Π, it should be the case that ψv(I) = ψ π(v) (π(I)), ∀v ∈ V .
In Axiom 1,
The second axiom states that only relative values matter: the average centrality is normalized to 1,
To state the next axiom, we need the following definition. We say v ∈ V is an isolated node in I = (V, E, PI), if ∀S, T ⊆ V \{v} with S ⊆ T , PI(S∪{v}, T ∪{v}) = PI(S, T ). In the extreme case, PI({v}, {v}) = PI(∅, ∅) = 1, meaning that v only activates itself, No seed set can influence v unless it contains v: For any S, T ⊆ V \ {v} with S ⊆ T , PI(S, T ∪ {v}) ≤ 1 − T ⊇S,T ⊆V \{v} PI(S, T ) = 1 − T ⊇S,T ⊆V \{v} PI(S ∪ {v}, T ∪ {v}) = 0. The role of v in any seed set is just to activate itself: The probability of activating other nodes is unchanged if v is removed from the seed set. The next axiom requires the following natural interpretation of centrality measure for an isolated node:
The next axiom characterizes the centrality of another type of extreme nodes in social influence. In instance I = (V, E, PI), we say v ∈ V is a sink node if ∀S, T ⊆ V \ {v}, PI(S ∪ {v}, T ∪ {v}) = PI(S, T ) + PI(S, T ∪ {v}). In the extreme case when S = T = ∅, PI({v}, {v}) = 1, i.e., v can only influence itself. When v joins another S to form a seed set, the influence to a target T ∪ {v} can always be achieved by S alone (except perhaps the influence to v itself). Thus, sink node has no influence to other nodes. An isolated node is a sink node, but the reverse may not be true.
Because a sink node v has no influence on other nodes, we can remove it and obtain a projection of the influence model on the network without v: Let I \ {v} = (V \ {v}, E \ {v}, P I\{v} ) denote the projected instance over vertex set V \ {v}, where E \ {v} = {(i, j) ∈ E : v ∈ {i, j}} and P I\{v} is the influence model such that for all S, T ⊆ V \ {v},
The next axiom considers the simple case when the influence instance has two sink nodes u, v ∈ V . In such a case, v and u have no influence to each other, and they influence no one else. Thus, their centrality should be fully determined by V − {u, v}: removing one sink node -say v -should not affect the centrality measure of another sink node u.
Axiom 4 (Independence of Sink Nodes). For any influence-instance I = (V, E, PI), for any pair of sink nodes u, v ∈ V in I, it should be the case: ψu(I) = ψu(I \ {v}).
The next axiom further highlights the interplay between social-influence and network centrality. It considers the standard Bayesian social influence through a given network: Given a graph G = (V, E), and r social-influence instances on G:
. Let λ = (λ1, λ2, . . . , λr) be a prior distribution on [r], i.e. Axiom 5 (Bayesian). For any network G = (V, E) and Bayesian social-influence model I B({I θ },λ) , and ∀v ∈ V :
The last axiom characterizes the centrality of a family of simple social-influence instances. In a critical set instance, denoted by IR,v = (R ∪ {v}, E, PI R,v ), the network is the complete directed bipartite graph (R ∪ {v}, E) from a nonempty R to a sink node v. The influence model is:
In other words, R is the critical set to activate all nodes. But, if any node in R is missed, the seed set can only achieve the minimum influence on themselves. . This axiom can be interpreted through Nash's solution [18] to the bargaining game between a player representing the critical set R and the sink node v. Let r = |R|. Player R can influence all nodes by itself, achieving utility r +1, while player v can only influence itself, with utility 1. The threat point of this bargaining game is (r, 0), which reflects the credits that each player agrees that the other player should at least receive: Player v agrees that player R's contribution is at least r, while player R thinks that player v may not have any contribution because R can activate everyone. The slack in this threat point is ∆ = r +1−(r +0) = 1. However, in this case, player R is actually a coalition of r nodes, and these r nodes have to cooperate in order to influence all r + 1 nodes -missing any node in R will not influence v. The need to cooperative in order to bargain with player v weakens player R. The ratio of v's bargaining weight to that of R is thus 1 to 1/r. Nash's bargaining solution [18] provides a fair division of this slack between the two players:
The unique solution is (x1, x2) = (r +
r+1
). Thus, node v should receive a credit of r r+1
, as stated in Axiom 6.
A Representation Theorem
The Shapley centrality is defined as the Shapley value of the following natural cooperative game:
We prove the following axiomatic characterization:
Shapley is the unique centrality measure that satisfies Axioms 1-6.
The soundness of this representation theorem -that the Shapley centrality satisfies all axioms -is relatively simple. However, because of the intrinsic complexity in influence models, the uniqueness proof is in fact complex (with over two pages). We give a high-level proof sketch here and the full proof is in Appendix B. Schematically, we follows Myerson's proof strategy [16] of Shapley's theorem. We view the probabilistic details of a social-influence instance I = (V, E, PI), PI : 2 V × 2 V → R, as a vector. We first establish that any axiom-conforming centrality measure must be linear in the probabilistic profiles. We then prove that the critical set instances can be extended to built a full-rank basis of the linear space defined by {PI}I. Finally, we prove that any axiom-conforming centrality measure over critical set instances and their extensions must be unique. Our overall proof is more complex and -to a certain degree -more subtle than Myerson's proof, because our axiomatic framework is based on the influence model, rather than on subset utilities. The distribution profile of an influence model has much higher dimensionality than its influence-spread profile.
Properties Implied by the Representation Theorem First, the representation theorem establishes the following appealing property: Our axioms characterize the centrality based only on the interplay between network structures and distribution profiles of the social-influence processes. Theorem 2 proves that the axiom-conforming centrality measure is in fact fully characterized by the influence-spread profiles. We find this remarkable because -as we noted above -the distribution profile of an influence model has much higher dimensionality than its influence-spread profile.
The Shapley centrality has the following Nondiscrimination Property: In every instance I = (V, E, PI), if a pair u, v ∈ V have the same marginal influence spread with respect to every subset of S ∈ V \ {u, v}, i.e., σI(S ∪ {u}) = σI(S ∪ {v}), then u and v have the same centrality.
Second, the representation theorem extends Nash's bargaining principle from the case where one node has a "oneway" influence over another one (i.e., Axiom 6 with |R| = 1) to the more general mutual-influence instance between Alice and Bob of Section 1. . This is exactly Nash's solution to the bargaining game between Alice (with influence spread 1 + p) and Bob (with influence spread 1 + q) for splitting two units with threat point (1 − q, 1 − p).
Third, Theorem 2 demonstrates that the axioms broadly extend the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA)) principle of Axioms 3 and 4 regarding sink nodes: If an instance I = (V, E, PI) is the union of two independent influence instances, I1 = (V1, E1, PI 1 ) and I2 = (V2, E2, PI 2 ), then for k ∈ {1, 2} and any v ∈ V k : ψv(I) = ψv(I k ).
Shapley Symmetry of the Symmetric IC Model
The game-theoretical centrality and its axiomatic characterization provide us with a mathematical lens for studying network influence models. Indeed, the Shapley centrality reveals some intrinsic properties of influence models. Recall that an IC instance (V, E, {pu,v} (u,v)∈E ) is symmetric if pu,v = pv,u, ∀u, v ∈ V . Our analysis proves the following statement: For any symmetric IC instance, the Shapley centrality of every node is 1. The formal proof is in Appendix C.
At first glance, this observation is surprising and counterintuitive: It appears to reveal a limitation within the Shapley centrality, as it is independent of the network structure and symmetric IC edge probabilities. This Shapley Symmetry of the Symmetric IC Model in fact sheds light on both network influence and game-theoretical centrality. (1) The "pair-wise symmetry and independence" condition is an extreme assumption (that also rarely holds for real-world influence propagation). (2) The Shapley centrality remarkably reveals this symmetry because of the following: Instead of measuring individual influence spreads in isolation from other nodes, the Shapley centrality captures the expected "irreplaceable power" of each node in group influence. In other words, the individual influence spread of a single node implicitly assumes that the node always comes first in generating influence, but this influence power of the node may be replaceable by other nodes if other nodes generate influence first. In contrast, the Shapley centrality of the node assumes that the node has no special position but comes in a random order. It focuses on the marginal influence of the node in this random order, which can be interpreted as the power of the node that cannot be replaced by other nodes. For the symmetric IC case, the equal Shapley centrality exactly points out that all nodes in the network are replaceable if their are equally positioned in a random order.
EXPERIMENTS
We conduct experiments on a number of real-world social networks, both small and large, and demonstrate the important features of Shapley centrality as well as the efficiency of our scalable algorithm ASV-RR.
Experiment Setup
The network datasets we used are summarized in Table 1 . We use two small networks as case studies for socialinfluence Shapley centrality. The first one is the Zachary's karate club (ZK), a well-known network often used for community detection [29] . ZK is a network of 34 individuals in a karate club that were split into two communities. The second one is a collaboration network in the field of Data Mining (DM), extracted from the ArnetMiner archive (arnetminer.org). The influence probability profile between researchers is learned by the topic affinity algorithm TAP proposed in [25] . The mapping from node ids to author names is available, allowing us to gain some intuitive observations of the Shapley centrality, and compare it with the ranking based on individual influence spreads.
We further use three large networks to demonstrate the effectiveness of the Shapley centrality and the scalability of our algorithm. Flixster (FX) is a directed network with 29K nodes, extracted from movie rating site flixster.com. The nodes are users and a directed edge from u to v means that v has rated some movie(s) that u rated earlier. Both network and the influence probability profile are obtained from the authors of [5] , which shows how to learn topic-aware influence probabilities. We use influence probabilities on topic 1 in their provided data as an example. DBLP (DB) is another academic collaboration network with 654K nodes. DB is extracted from online archive DBLP (dblp.uni-trier.de) and used for influence studies in [28] . Finally, LiveJournal (LJ) is the largest network we tested with. With 4.8M nodes and 69M edges, and LJ is a directed network of bloggers, obtained from Stanford's SNAP project (snap.stanford.edu). LJ was previously used for evaluating the scalability of influence-maximization algorithms in [27, 26] .
In our experiments, we use the independent cascade (IC) as the influence model. Recall that IC requires an edgeprobability profile of the network. Through our initial experiments, we discovered the "Shapley Symmetry" of Symmetric IC Models, a surprising mathematical property discussed earlier in Section 4.2. Here, we focus on asymmetric IC models. The schemes for generating influence-probability profiles are also shown in Table 1 , where WC, PR, and LN stand for weighted cascade, PageRank-based, and learned from real data, respectively. Weighted cascade assignment is a scheme of [13] , which assigns pu,v = 1/dv to edge (u, v) ∈ E, where dv is the in-degree of node v. An important feature of WC is that, if u's in-degree is larger than v's in-degree, then pu,v > pv,u. WC defines a degree-based asymmetric IC model. PageRank-based assignment, PR, is inspired by the idea of WC. Instead of in-degree, PR uses the nodes' PageRank [7] : We first compute the PageRank score r(v) for every node v ∈ V in the unweighted network, using 0.15 as the restart parameter. Then, for each (u, v) ∈ E, PR assigns an edge probability of r(u)/(r(u) + r(v)) · n/m. In PR, similar to WC, pu,v > pv,u if r(u) > r(v). The scaling factor n/m is to normalize the total edge probabilities to n for undirected network or close to n for directed networks. PR defines a PageRank-based asymmetric IC model. The learned parameter setting (LN) applies to DM and FX datasets, where we obtain learned influence-probability profiles from the authors of the original studies.
We implemented our ASV-RR algorithm and other related algorithms in Visual C++, compiled in Visual Studio 2013. We ran small network tests on a local Surface Pro 3 laptop. For large network tests, we use a server computer with 2.4GHz Intel(R) Xeon(R) E5530 CPU, 2 processors (16 cores), 48G memory, and Windows Server 2008 R2 (64 bits). In our ASV-RR algorithm, we use the estimated influence spread of the highest degree node as b. As we stated before, this estimate in line 3 ASV-RR helps improving the running time of our algorithm.
Experiment Results

Results on Small Networks
For ZK and DM, we compute their Shapley centralities and visually inspect the top ranked nodes. We also compare them with the ranking obtained according to individual influence spreads. We use the IMM algorithm of [26] to approximate individual influence spreads. We set ε = 0.01 and = 1 for both our ASV-RR and the IMM algorithms. For ZK, the top two nodes according to all rankings (WC or PR, Shapley or individual influence spreads) are the same. They are nodes 34 and 1 (in this order), who are the club's administrator and instructor of the club and leaders of the two communities [29] . Other top ranked orders are also similar. Due to space limit, we ignore the detailed report here.
For the DM network, we have three influence profiles: WC, PR, and LN. Table 2 listed the top 10 nodes in each ranking, together with the numerical values of the ranking. The names appeared in all ranking results are well-known 
First, comparing the three Shapley centrality rankings, we see that some researchers appear in multiple top rankings, but ranking orders are different. In particular, the sets of top 10 researchers in DM-WC and DM-PR rankings share 7 people (and share 4 out of the top 5). Part of the reason is that, although WC and PR have different influence profiles, the probabilities are related to the degrees of nodes. Thus, these two rankings are highly correlated due to this degree factor. On the other hand, the DM-LN ranking shares only 5 out of the top 10 researchers with either DM-WC or DM-PR ranking. The reduced correlation reflects the fact that DM-LN obtains the influence probabilities from the TAP algorithm [25] , which uses researchers' topic distributions as the main source for deriving influence profiles. Here, we are not trying to argue which ranking is better. But instead, this experiment is a clear demonstration of the interplay between social influence and network centrality. Different influence processes can lead to different centrality rankings. But when they share some aspects of common "ground-true" influence, their induced rankings are also correlated.
Second, under same probability profiles, we compare the Shapley centrality ranking with individual-influence ranking. In general, the two top-10 ranking results align quite well with each other, showing that in these influence instances, high individual influence usually translates into high marginal influence. Some noticeable exception also exists. For example, Christos Faloutsos is ranked No.3 in the DM-PR Shapley centrality, but he is not in Top-10 based on DM-PR individual influence ranking. Conceptually, this would mean that, in the DM-PR model, Professor Faloutsos has better Shapley ranking because he has more unique and marginal impact comparing to his individual influence.
Finally, from the numerical values, we see that in DM-WC and DM-PR, top rankers have relatively small Shapley values comparing to those in DM-LN. This supports the notion that the topic-based influence learning method differentiate researchers more than the degree-based methods.
Overall, our experiments with the small datasets qualitatively verify that Shapley centralities provide reasonable ranking results and reflect different aspects of network influence models. 
Tuning Parameter ε
We now investigate the impact of our ASV-RR parameters, to be applied to our tests on large datasets. Parameter is a simple parameter controlling the probability, 1 − 1 n , that the accuracy guarantee holds. We set it to 1, which is the same as in [27, 26] . For parameter ε, a smaller value improves accuracy at the cost of higher running time. Thus, we want to set ε at a proper level to balance accuracy and efficiency.
We test different ε values from 0.05 to 0.5, on both DM and FX datasets. To evaluate the accuracy, we use the results from ε = 0.01 as the benchmark: For v ∈ V , suppose s * v and sv are the Shapley values computed for ε = 0.01 and a larger ε value, respectively. Then, we compute |sv − s * v |/s * v and use it as the relative error at v. Since the top rankers' relative errors are the more important, we take top 50 nodes from the two ranking results, and compute the average relative error over the union of these two sets of top 50 nodes. Figure 1 reports our results on the three DM options and the FX dataset. We can see clearly that the relative error is small when ε is at most 0.1 for all cases: The worst case is DM-PR, which has the average relative error of 0.06 when ε = 0.1. The errors start to increase faster afterwards. Other cases have much smaller relative errors. Hence, setting ε = 0.1 is sufficient to maintain the accuracy of Shapley value computations. Meanwhile, this setting reduces the running time 100 fold from ε = 0.01. By our theory, the running time is proportional to 1/ε 2 . In the remaining tests on large datasets, we will set ε = 0.1.
Results on Large Networks
We conduct experiments to evaluate both the effectiveness and the efficiency of our ASV-RR algorithm on large networks. For large networks, it is no longer easy to inspect rankings manually, especially when these datasets lack user profiles. For the effectiveness, we assess the effectiveness of Shapley centrality rankings through the lens of influence maximization. In particular, we use top rankers of Shapley centrality as seeds and measure their effectiveness for influence maximization. We compare the quality and performance of our algorithm with the state-of-the-art scalable algorithm IMM proposed in [26] for influence maximization. Note that the IMM algorithm is based on the RR set approach. For IMM, we set its parameters as ε = 0.1 and = 1, matching the parameter settings we used for ASV-RR. We also choose a baseline algorithm Degree, which selects top degree nodes as seeds for influence maximization. We run ASV-RR, IMM, and Degree on four influence instances: (1) the Flixster network with learned probability, (2) the DBLP network with WC parameters, (3) the DBLP network with PR parameters, and (4) the LiveJournal network with WC parameters. Figure 2 shows the results of these four tests whose objectives are to identify 50 influential seed nodes. The influence spread in each case is obtained by running 10K Monte Carlo simulations and taking the average value. The results on FX-LN, DB-WC, and LJ-WC show that the Shapley-centrality-based seeds perform closely to the seeds selected by the state-of-the-art IMM algorithm, showing that marginal influence in these cases do play an important role in maximizing influence. In the FX-LN case, they also significantly outperform the Degree heuristic.
The result on DB-PR is quite different from the other results. In this case, the first seed selected by either IMM or Degree already achieves a high influence spread of over 95K, but the additional seeds selected only slighted improve the influence spread. On the contrary, the first few Shapleycentrality-based seeds have relative small influence spreads (around 1K), and the overall influence only starts to catch up to the other algorithms after 30 seeds are chosen. We believe that the initial nodes selected by Degree and IMM are very likely from a giant strongly connected component in the live-edge graph. So, the first seed is enough to activate a large component, but additional seeds only have incremental benefits. In this case, as we argued in the similar case of symmetric IC networks, the Shapley centrality will not give nodes in such giant components very high values, because their marginal influence in a random order is likely to be small. Instead, the Shapley centrality rankings focus on other components and nodes that have large marginal influence. Seeds with high Shapley centrality selected by ASV-RR may have relatively small individual influence, but they have large expected marginal influence. This is a clear empirical evidence that Shapley centrality is different from individual influence -some nodes may have large individual influence but may not be ranked high in Shapley centrality, because Shapley centrality focuses on expected marginal influence. Conceptually, this is similar to the Shapley symmetry of the symmetric IC model discussed in Section 4.2.
Finally, we evaluate the scalability of our ASV-RR algorithm. The baseline Shapley computation directly using random permutations is just too slow to run on large networks. So we aim higher, and compare the running time of our ASV-RR algorithm with the scalable IMM algorithm, even though these two algorithms are designed for different problems. Our purpose is to show that ASV-RR has similar scalability as the state-of-the-art scalable algorithm IMM for influence maximization. Table 3 reports the running time of the two algorithms on four large influence instances. The running time of ASV-RR includes computing the Shapley centralities of all nodes in the network and sorting them, while the running time of IMM is for selecting 50 seed nodes. We can see that the running time of ASV-RR is generally in the same order of IMM, and in one case (DB-PR), it is actually significantly faster than IMM. On the largest graph LiveJournal with 4.8M nodes and 69M edges, ASV-RR only takes 14.3 minutes to finish. Therefore, ASV-RR is a highly scalable algorithm for computing Shapley centralities. In summary, our experimental results on small and large datasets demonstrate that the social-influence Shapley centrality effectively reflects network-influence models. The Shapley centrality is closely related to influence maximization. But both in theory and in practice, it differentiates from influence maximization: It focuses on expected marginal influence. Our algorithm ASV-RR is highly scalable and can process large networks with millions of nodes and edges, matching the scalability of the state-of-the-art influence-maximization algorithm IMM. Finally, we remark that IMM is known to have high memory complexity due to its need to store all RR sets. Our ASV-RR processes RR sets as data streams, and is highly scalable in memory usage.
DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
Our study provides a comprehensive algorithmic and axiomatic analysis of centrality measures in the context of network influence. In Appendix E, we also extend our scalable algorithm and axiomatic characterization to weighted Shapley centrality, which incorporates node weights.
The axiomatic characterization provides a comparative mathematical framework for analyzing the difference between Shapley centrality and other centrality measures. For example, the Shapley symmetry of the symmetric IC model illustrates the basic difference between Shapley centrality and the centrality based on individual influence spreads. The latter satisfies Axioms 1, 3, 4, and 5, but not Axioms 2 and 6. The normalized individual influence spreads become inconsistent with Axiom 5.
The comparative analysis of the Shapley centrality and other centrality measures have also lead us to another fundamental dimension of game-theoretical centrality of network influence: bounded rationality. In the social-influence game, each group -regardless of its size -can fully exert its influence. However, many influence problems, such as viral marketing, are usually only concerned with the influence of small groups. Built on this comparative analysis, we have obtained preliminary results which show that by introducing "bounded rationality" into the influence game, the Shapley value can capture various aspects of influence power. This paper lays a foundation for the further development of algorithmic and axiomatic theory for game-theoretical interpretations of network data, which we hope will provide us with deeper insight into network structures and influence models.
APPENDIX A. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proposition 2. Fix a subset R ⊆ V . For any v ∈ R, Pr(R ∩ Sπ,v = ∅) = 1/|R|, where π is a random permutation on V , and Sπ,v is the subset of nodes preceding v in π.
Proof. The event R∩Sπ,v = ∅ is equivalent to π placing v ahead other nodes in R. Because π is a random permutation, this event happens with probability exactly 1/|R|.
In discussion below, we will use v ∼ V to denote that v is drawn uniformly at random from V . The following is a straightforward proposition to verify: Proposition 3. A random RR set R is equivalently generated by first (a) generating a random live-edge graph L, and (b) selecting v ∼ V . Then, R is the set of nodes that can reach v in L.
Let I{E} be the indicator function for event E.
Lemma 4. Let R be a random RR set. For any fixed set S ⊆ V and a fixed node v ∈ V \ S, σ(S) = n · Pr(S ∩ R = ∅),
Proof. Let L be a random live-edge graph generated from the triggering model, as explained in Section 2.1. Then we have
where u is a random node uniformly selected from V . Notation Ex [Ey[f (x, y)]] for random variables x, y and function f is the same as E [E[f (x, y) | x = x]], i.e. fix the value of random variable x to x first, then take the conditional expectation of f (x, y) conditioned on x = x, and finally take the expectation based on the distribution of x. By Proposition 3, event u ∈ Γ(L, S) is the same as the event S ∩ R = ∅. Hence we have σ(S) = n · Pr(S ∩ R = ∅).
Similarly,
where u is a random node uniformly selected from V . With a similar argument, event u ∈ Γ(L, S ∪ {v}) \ Γ(L, S) is the same as the event v ∈ R ∧ S ∩ R = ∅. Hence we have
For a fixed subset R ⊆ V and a node v ∈ V , let XR(v) be 0 if v ∈ R, and 1/|R| if v ∈ R. If R is a random RR set, then X R (v) is a random variable. The following is a restatement of Lemma 1 using the X R (v) random variable.
Lemma 5. Given a node v ∈ V . Let R be a random RR set. Then the Shapley value
Proof. Let R be a random RR set. We have
Note that when R is fixed,
Lemma 6. For any v ∈ V , the estimated valueφ v returned by Algorithm 1 satisfies E[φ v ] = φv, where the expectation is taken over all randomness used in the algorithm.
Proof. In Phase 2 of the algorithm, when θ is fixed to be any value θ, the algorithm generates θ independent random RR sets R1, . . . , R θ . It is straightforward to see that at the end of the for-loop in Phase 2, we have estv 
Let σ * 1 = maxv∈V σ({v}) be the largest influence spread of a single node as defined in Theorem 1.
Proof. By the submodularity of σ(·),
Lemma 9. In the Phase 2 of Algorithm ASV-RR, for any fixed value θ of θ satisfying θ ≥ n(( + 1) ln n + ln 4)(2 + ε)
We have that with probability at least 1 − 1 2n
, ∀v ∈ V, |φ v − φv| ≤ εσ *
.
Proof. Let R1, R2, . . . , R θ be the θ independent and random RR sets generated in Phase 2. Then for all v ∈ V , at the end of the for-loop in Phase 2, estv =
Apply the Chernoff bounds (Fact 7), we have:
{use Eq. (4)} Finally, we take the union bound among all n nodes in V to obtain the result.
Lemma 10. Let v * be a random node drawn from V with probability proportional to the in-degree of v * . Let R be a random RR set. Then
Proof. This is by Lemma 4 in [27] . For completeness, we repeat the proof here. For a fixed set R ⊆ V , let p(R) be the probability that a randomly selected edge from E points to a node in R. Since R has ω(R) edges pointing to nodes in R, we have p(R) = ω(R)/m.
let dv denotes the in-degree of node v. Let v * be a random node drawn from v with probability proportional to the indegree of v * . We have
Let R be a random RR set. Then we have
where the last equality is by Lemma 4.
Lemma 11. Let ρ be the average width of RR sets computed in Phase 1 of Algorithm ASV-RR, after sampling α RR sets. Let R be a random RR set. If α ≥ 10n( ln n+ln 4) m , then with probability at least 1 − . By the Chernoff bounds (Fact 7), we have
, where the last inequality is from Lemma 10.
Lemma 12. With probability at least 1 − ). This implies
Then by Lemma 9, we know that under the above condition, with probability at least 1 −
2n
, we have ∀v ∈ V, |φ v − φv| ≤ εσ * 1 . Taking the union bound, we know that with probability at least 1 − 1 n , we have ∀v ∈ V, |φ v − φv| ≤ εσ * 1 .
Lemma 13. Suppose ≤ 1 and m ≥ 2. With probability at least 1 − 1 n , the running time of ASV-RR is O( (m + n) log n/ε 2 ). When ≥ 1, the expected running time of ASV-RR is O( (m + n) log n/ε 2 ).
Proof. We first prove the high probability running time result. Let R be a random RR set. Phase 1 of ASV-RR generates α = O( n log n/m) RR sets, and thus the running time is at most O( n log n), considering the worst case of generating an RR set taking O(m) time. In Phase 2, by Lemma 11, with probability at least 1
, the last quantity of which is defined asθ. Let R1, R2, . . . be the random RR sets generated in the second phase under the above high probability event {E[ω(R)]/2 ≤ ρ}. Thus, we have at mostθ RR sets. For each RR set Ri, it takes O(ω(Ri)) time to generate Ri, and then |Ri| time to update estv for v ∈ Ri. Note that |Ri| ≤ ω(Ri) + 1 because the RR set generation process guarantees that the induced sub graph of any RR set must be weakly connected. Thus total running time of Phase 2 is at most
. Applying the Chernoff bound again (Fact 7), we have
The last inequality holds since ε ≤ 1 and m ≥ 2. Therefore, using union bound we have that with probability at least 1 − 1 n , the Phase 2 running time T 2 is at most
2 ). Combining the running time of Phase 1, we have that with probability at least 1 − 1 n , the running time of ASV-RR is O( (m + n) log n/ε 2 ). We now prove the expected running time result. The running time of Phase 1 is in worst case O( n log n), as argued above. Let R be a random RR set. In Phase 2, by Lemma 11, with probability at least 1
). Each iteration of the for-loop in Phase 2 takes expected running time of E[ω(R)] to generate an RR set, and then
2 ) expected time. Finally, with probability at most
, in which case we use max(2ρ, 3bm/n) ≥ 3m/n. In this case, the running time is at most O(θ · E[ω(R)]) = O( mn log n/ε 2 ). When ≥ 1, the contribution to the expected running time is O(1/n · ( mn log n/ε 2 )) = O( m log n/ε 2 ). Combining the case of E[ω(R)]/2 ≤ ρ and the case of ρ < E[ω(R)]/2 together, we know that the expected running time for Phase 2 is O( m log n/ε 2 ). Finally, together with Phase 1, we have that the expected running time of ASV-RR is O( (m + n) log n/ε 2 ).
Proof of Theorem 1. The proof of the theorem is complete with Lemmas 6, 12 and 13.
B. PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Analysis of Sink Nodes
We first prove that the involvement of sink nodes in the influence process is what we have expected: (1) The marginal contribution of a sink node v is equal to the probability that v is not influenced by the seed set. (2) For any other node u ∈ V , u's activation probability is the same whether or not v is in the seed set. Lemma 14. Suppose v is a sink node in I = (V, E, PI). Then, (a) for any S ⊆ V \ {v}:
(b) for any u = v and any S ⊆ V \ {u, v}:
Proof. For (a), by the definitions of σI and sink nodes:
Lemma 14 immediately implies that for any two sink nodes u and v, u's marginal contribution to any S ⊆ V \{u, v} is the same as its marginal contribution to S ∪{v}.
Lemma 15 (Independence between Sink Nodes).
If u and v are two sink nodes in I, then for any S ⊆ V \{u, v}, σI(S∪{v, u})−σI(S∪{v}) = σI(S∪{u})−σI(S).
Proof. By Lemma 14 (a) and (b), both sides are equal to Pr(u ∈ II(S)).
The next two lemmas connect the influence spreads in original and projected instances.
Lemma 16. If v is a sink in I, then for any S ⊆ V \ {v}:
Proof. By the definition of influence projection:
Lemma 17. For any two sink nodes u and v in I:
Proof. By Lemmas 16 and 14 (b) , we have
Soundness
Lemma 18. The Shapley centrality defined in Definition 4 satisfies all Axioms 1-6.
Proof. Let ψ * be the Shapley centrality map: ψ Shapley . Axioms 1, 2, and 5 are trivially satisfied by ψ * , or are direction implications from the original Shapley axiom set. For Axiom 3, suppose v is an isolated node in an instance I. For any S ⊆ V \ {v},
The last equality above also relies on the fact that for any S, T ⊆ V \ {v}, PI(S, T ∪ {v}) = 0, which follows from definition of isolated node, and is already pointed out before Axiom 3. Then, for a random permutation π, we have that ψ * u (I) = Eπ[σI(Sπ,u ∪ {u}) − σI(Sπ,u)] = Eπ[1] = 1, and Axiom 3 is satisfied.
Next, we show that ψ * satisfies Axiom 4, the Axiom of Independence of Sink Nodes. Let u and v be two sink nodes. Let π be a random permutation on V . Let π be the random permutation on V \ {v} derived from π by removing v from the random order. Let {u ≺π v} be the event that u is ordered before v in the permutation π. Note that since π is a random permutation, Pr(u ≺π v) = Pr(v ≺π u) = 1/2. Then we have
= ψ * u (I \ {v}). Eq.(5) above uses Lemma 15, while Eq.(6) uses Lemma 17.
Finally, we show that ψ * satisfies Axiom 6, the Critical Set Axiom. By the definition of the critical set instance, we know that if influence instance I has critical set R, then σI(S) = |V | if S ⊇ R, and σI(S) = |S| if S ⊇ R. Then for v ∈ R, for any S ⊆ V \ {v}, σI(S ∪ {v}) − σI(S) = 0 if S ⊇ R, and σI(S ∪ {v}) − σI(S) = 1 if S ⊇ R. For a random permutation π, the event R ⊆ Sπ,v is the event that all nodes in R are ordered before v in π, which has probability 1/(|R| + 1). Then we have that for v ∈ R,
Therefore, Shapley centrality ψ * is a solution to all Axioms 1-6.
Completeness (or Uniqueness)
We now prove the uniqueness of axiom set A. Fix a graph G = (V, E). For any R, U ⊆ V with R = ∅ and R ⊆ U , we define the critical set instance IR,U , an extension to the critical set instance IR,v defined for Axiom 6.
Definition 5. For any R, U ⊆ V with R = ∅ and R ⊆ U , the critical set instance IR,U = (V, E, PI R,U ) is the one such that for all S ⊇ R, PI R,U (S, U ∪ S) = 1, and for all S ⊇ R, PI R,U (S, S) = 1. For this instance, R is called the critical set, and U is called the target set.
Intuitively, for the critical set instance IR,U , once the seed set contains the critical set R, it guarantees to activate target set U together with other nodes in S; but as long as some nodes in R is not included in the seed set S, only nodes in S can be activated. These critical set instances play an important role in the uniqueness proof. Thus we first provide some properties about them.
Lemma 19. In the critical set instance IR,U , every node in V \ U is an isolated node, and every node in V \ R is a sink node.
Proof. We first prove that any node v ∈ V \ U is an isolated node. In fact, consider any two subsets S, T ⊆ T \ {v} with S ⊆ T . If S ⊇ R, then by Definition 5, PI(S ∪ {v}, T ∪ {v}) = 1 if and only if T ∪ {v} = U ∪ S ∪ {v}, which is equivalent to T = U ∪ S since v ∈ U . This implies that PI(S ∪ {v}, T ∪ {v}) = PI(S, T ). If S ⊇ R, then by Definition 5 PI(S ∪ {v}, T ∪ {v}) = 1 if and only if T ∪ {v} = S ∪ {v}, which is equivalent to T = S. This again implies that PI(S ∪ {v}, T ∪ {v}) = PI(S, T ). Therefore, by the definition of isolated node, we know that v is an isolated node.
Next we show that any node v ∈ R is a sink node. In fact, consider any two subsets S, T ⊆ T \ {v} with S ⊆ T . If S ⊇ R, then PI(S ∪ {v}, T ∪ {v}) = 1 if and only if T ∪{v} = U ∪S ∪{v}, which is equivalent to T = U ∪S \{v}. Depending on whether v ∈ U , T = U ∪S\{v} is equivalent to exactly one of T = U ∪S or T ∪{v} = U ∪S being true. This implies that PI(S∪{v}, T ∪{v}) = PI(S, T )+PI(S, T ∪{v}). If S ⊇ R, then PI(S ∪ {v}, T ∪ {v}) = 1 if and only if T ∪ {v} = S ∪ {v}, which is equivalent to T = S. This also implies that PI(S ∪{v}, T ∪{v} = PI(S, T )+PI(S, T ∪{v}). Therefore, v is a sink node by definition.
Lemma 20. In the critical set instance IR,U , for any node v ∈ V \U , the projected influence instance of IR,U on V \{v}, IR,U \ {v}, is a critical set instance with critical set R and target U , in the projected graph G \ {v} = (V \ {v}, E \ {v}). For any node v ∈ U \ R, the projected influence instance of IR,U on V \ {v}, IR,U \ {v}, is a critical set instance with critical set R and target U \ {v}, in the projected graph G \ {v} = (V \ {v}, E \ {v}).
Proof. First let v ∈ V \ U and consider projected instance IR,U \ {v}. If S ⊆ V \ {v} is a subset with S ⊇ R, then by the projection definition and the critical set definition (Definition 5),
If S ⊆ V \ {v} is a subset with S ⊇ R, similarly we have
Thus by Definition 5, we know that IR,U \ {v} is still a critical set instance with R as the critical set and U as the target set.
Next let v ∈ U \ R and consider projected instance IR,U \ {v}. If S ⊆ V \ {v} is a subset with S ⊇ R, then by the projection definition and the critical set definition (Definition 5),
Thus by Definition 5, we know that IR,U \ {v} is still a critical set instance with R as the critical set and U \ {v} as the target set.
Lemma 21. Fix a graph G = (V, E). Let ψ be a centrality measure that satisfies axiom set A. For any R, U ⊆ V with R = ∅ and R ⊆ U , and the critical set instance IR,U as defined in Definition 5, its centrality ψ(IR,U ) must be unique.
Proof. Consider the critical set instance IR,U . First, it is easy to check that all nodes in R are symmetric to one another, all nodes in U \ R are symmetric to one another, and all nodes in V \ U are symmetric to one another. Thus, by the Anonymity Axiom (Axiom 1), all nodes in R have the same centrality measure, say aR,U , all nodes in U \ R have the same centrality measure, say bR,U , and all nodes in V \ U have the same centrality measure, say cR,U . By the Normalization Axiom (Axiom 2), we have
Second, by Lemma 19, any node v ∈ V \ U is an isolated node. Then by the Isolated Node Axiom (Axiom 3), we know that the centrality measure of v is 1, which means cR,U = 1.
Third, if U = R, then we do not have parameter bR,U and aR,U is determined by Eq. (7). If U = R, then by Lemma 19,  any node v ∈ V \ R is a sink node. Then we can apply the Sink Node Axiom (Axiom 4) to iteratively remove all but the last node v ∈ U \ R, such that the centrality measure of v does not change after the removal. By Lemma 20, the remaining instance with node set R ∪{v} is still a critical set instance with critical set R and target set R ∪ {v}. Thus we can apply the Critical Set Axiom (Axiom 6) to this remaining influence instance, and know that the centrality measure of v is |R|/(|R| + 1), that is, bR,U = |R|/(|R| + 1). Therefore, aR,U is also uniquely determined, which means that the centrality measure ψ(IR,U ) for instance IR,U is unique, for every nonempty subset R and its superset U .
For every instance I, we can view it as a vector specifying the probability value PI(S, T ) for every subset S and its superset T . Note that when S = ∅, we have PI(S, T ) = 1 if and only if T = ∅, and when S = V , PI(S, T ) = 1 if and only if T = V . Thus, the specifying vector does not need to include S = ∅ and S = V . Moreover, for any S, T ⊇S PI(S, T ) = 1, and thus we can omit one T ⊇ S from the specifying vector. We decide to remove T = S from the vector. With a bit of overloading on the notation, we also use PI to denote the vector for I, and thus PI(S, T ) is the value of the dimension corresponding to S, T . Vector PI has dimension m, which is the number of subsets with S ⊂ T and S ∈ {∅, V } (S ⊂ T means S ⊆ T but S = T ).
We stress that when we use PI as a vector and use linear combinations of such vectors, the vectors have no dimension corresponding to (S, T ) with S ∈ {∅, V } or S = T .
For each R and U with R ⊂ U and R ∈ {∅, V }, we consider the critical set instance IR,U and its corresponding vector PI R,U . Let V be the set of these vectors.
Lemma 22. Vectors in V are linearly independent in the space R m .
Proof. Suppose, for a contradiction, that vectors in V are not linearly independent. Then for each such R and U , we have a number αR,U ∈ R, such that R ∈{∅,V },R⊂U αR,U · PI R,U = 0, and at least some αR,U = 0. Let S be the smallest set with αS,U = 0 for some U ⊃ S, and let T be any superset of S with αS,T = 0. By the critical set instance definition, we have PI S,T (S, T ) = 1. Also since the vector does not contain any dimension corresponding to PI(S, S), we know that T ⊃ S. Then by the minimality of S, we have
For the third term in Eq. (8), consider any set R with |R| ≥ |S| and R = S. We have that S ⊇ R, and thus by the critical set instance definition, for any U ⊃ R, PI R,U (S, S) = 1.
Since T ⊃ S, we have T = S, and thus PI R,U (S, T ) = 0. This means that the third term in Eq. (8) is 0.
For the second term in Eq. (8), consider any U ⊃ S with U = T . By the critical set instance definition, we have PI S,U (S, U ) = 1 (since S is the critical set and U is the target set). Then PI S,U (S, T ) = 0 since T = U . This means that the second term in Eq. (8) is also 0.
Then we conclude that αS,T = 0, which is a contradiction. Therefore, vectors in V are linearly independent.
The following is a general lemma useful for our uniqueness proof.
Lemma 23. Let ψ be a mapping from a convex set D ⊆ R m to R n satisfying that for any vectors v1, v2, . . . , vs ∈ D, for any α1, α2, . . . , αs ≥ 0 and
Suppose that D contains a set of linearly independent bases of R m , { b1, b2, . . . , bm} and also vector 0. Then for any v ∈ D, which can be represented as v = m i=1 λi · bi for some λ1, λ2, . . . , λm ∈ R, we have
Proof. We consider the convex hull formed by { b1, b2, . . . , bm} together with 0. Let
, which is an interior point in the convex hull. For any v ∈ D, since { b1, b2, . . . , bm} is a set of bases, we have
We select a ρ close enough to 1 such that for all i ∈ [m], ρ m+1 + (1 − ρ)λi ≥ 0, and ρ m+1
λi)) 0 is in the convex hull of { b1, b2, . . . , bm, 0}. Then from Eq.(9), we have
Lemma 24. The centrality measure satisfying axiom set A is unique.
Proof. Fix a graph G = (V, E). Let ψ be a centrality measure that satisfies axiom set A.
Let the null influence instance I N to be the instance in which no seed set has any influence except to itself, that is, For any S ⊆ V , P I N (S, S) = 1. It is straightforward to check that every node is an isolated node in the null instance, and thus by the Isolated Node Axiom (Axiom 3) we have ψv(I N ) = 1 for all v ∈ V . That is, ψv(I N ) is uniquely determined. Also note that P I N (S, S) is not in the vector representation of P I N . Thus vector P I N is an all-0 vector in R m . By Lemma 22, we know that V is a set of bases for R m . Then for any influence instance I,
where parameters λR,U ∈ R. Because of the Bayesian Axiom (Axiom 5), and the fact that the all-0 vector in R m is the influence instance I, we can apply Lemma 23 and obtain
where the notation ψ(PI) is the same as ψ(I). By Lemma 21 we know that all ψ(PI R,U )'s are uniquely determined. By the argument above, we also know that ψ(P I N ) is uniquely determined. Therefore, ψ(PI) must be unique.
Proof of Theorem 2. The theorem is proven by combining Lemmas 18 and 24.
C. SHAPLEY SYMMETRY OF SYMMET-RIC IC MODEL
In this appendix, we formally prove the Shapley symmetry of the symmetric IC model in the following theorem.
Theorem 3. In any symmetric IC model, the Shapley centrality of every node is the same.
We first prove the following lemma.
Lemma 25. Consider an undirected graph G = (V, E), and the IC model instance I on G in which for every undirected edge (u, v) ∈ E, pu,v = pv,u = 1. Then for any node v ∈ V , φ Proof. Let C be the connected component containing node v. For any fixed permutation π of V , if some other node u ∈ C appears before v in π, i.e. u ∈ Sπ,v, then u would influence every node in C including v, because all edges have influence probability 1 in both directions. In this case v has no marginal influence, that is, σI(Sπ,v ∪{v})−σI(Sπ,v) = 0. If v is the first node in C that appears in π, then v activates every node in C, and its marginal spread in this case is |C|. The probability that v appears first among all nodes in C in a random permutation π is exactly 1/|C|. Therefore, we have φ
Proof of Theorem 3. An important observation for the symmetric IC model is that we can use the following undirected live-edge graph model to represent its influence spread. For every edge (u, v) ∈ E, since we have pu,v = pv,u, we sample an undirected edge (u, v) with success probability pu,v, and the resulting undirected random live-edge graph is denoted asL. When the seed set S is fixed, one propagation instance from the seed set can only pass through edge (u, v) at most once, either from u to v or from v to u, but never in both directions. Therefore, we can apply the Principle of Deferred Decision and only decide the direction of the live edge (u, v) when the influence does need to pass the edge. Hence, the set of nodes reachable from S in the undirected graphL, Γ(L, S), is the set of activated nodes, and
When we fix the randomness ofL toL, the propagation on L is the same as treating every edge in L having influence probability 1 in both directions. Then by Lemma 25, the Shapley centrality of every node on the fixedL is the same. Finally, when we include the randomness ofL, we have
D. ALTERNATIVE AXIOM SET USING THE SPREAD DETERMINATION AX-IOM
This section provides an alternative axiom set that replaces the Isolated Node Axiom (Axiom 3) with the following Spread Determination Axiom.
Axiom 7 (Spread Determination). For two influence instances I1 = (V, E, PI 1 ) and I2 = (V, E, PI 2 ) on the same graph G = (V, E), if σI 1 = σI 2 , then ψ(I1) = ψ(I2).
Let Aσ denotes the set of Axioms after replacing Axiom 3 in A with the above axiom. It is trivial to see that the Shapley centrality also satisfies Axiom 7, and thus the main change of the proof is the uniqueness proof, which we state below. Since the centrality measure is fully determined by the influence spread, the uniqueness proof is simpler than the one for the axiom set A.
To facilitate the uniqueness proof, we study a similar set of axioms A , such that while the unique solution to Aσ is the Shapley value φ * (σI), the unique solution to A is the Shapley value φ * (σ I ), where σ I (S) = σI(S) − |S|. Function σ I (S) reflects in some sense the net payoff for selecting seed set S, since the additional influence σI(S) − |S| can be usually considered as the actual gain. Therefore, besides serving as a vehicle to prove the uniqueness of the axiom set Aσ, understanding axiom set A and its relationship to Aσ has its independent benefit. Axiom set A replaces Axiom 2 and 6 in Aσ with the following Axiom 2' and Axiom 6', while keeping the rest four axioms in Aσ unchanged.
Axiom 2'.
For every instance I = (V, E, D),
We first build the one-to-one correspondence between the centrality measures in the two axiom sets. Let ψ be a centrality measure. We define ψ − 1 to be another centrality measure ψ such that for every influence instance I and for every node v, ψ v (I) = ψv(I) − 1. We also define ψ + 1 in a similar way.
Lemma 26. If ψ is a centrality measure satisfying axiom set Aσ, then ψ − 1 is a centrality measure satisfying axiom set A . Conversely, if ψ is a centrality measure satisfying axiom set A , then ψ + 1 is a centrality measure satisfying axiom set Aσ.
Proof. Suppose that ψ is a centrality measure satisfying axiom set Aσ. Axioms 1, 7, 4, and 5 do no change between Aσ and A , and ψ−1 is only a constant change from ψ, so ψ− 1 also satisfies these axioms. Axioms 2 and 6 are changed to Axioms 2' and 6' respectively, which can be achieved exactly by reducing the centrality of each node by 1, and thus ψ − 1 satisfies Axioms 2' and 6'. The reverse statement can be argued symmetrically.
Lemma 26 above establishes the one-to-one correspondence between solutions to axiom set A and solutions to axiom set A , which means if we can prove that the solution to A is unique, we also proves that the solution to Aσ is unique. But before that, we give the following connection with Shapley value.
Lemma 27. Let σ I (S) = σI(S) − |S|, for any influence instance I and any subset S ⊆ V . Let ψ be the centrality measure derived from the Shapley value of σ I , that is ψ (I) = φ * (σ I ). Then ψ is a solution to axiom set A .
Proof. First, we have Lemma 28. The centrality measure satisfying axiom set A is unique.
Proof. Fix a graph G = (V, E). Let ψ be a centrality measure that satisfies axiom set A . For any R ⊆ V and R = ∅, let IR be an influence instance IR = (V, E, DR) in which R is the critical set and V is the target set, i.e. IR is a shorthand for IR,V . By the Anonymity Axiom (Axiom 1), all nodes in R have the same centrality measure, say aR, and all nodes outside R have the same centrality measure, say bR. By Axiom 2', we have aR ·|R|+bR ·(|V |−|R|) = 0. Consider any node v ∈ R, and any two subsets S, T ⊆ T \ {v}. If S ⊇ R, then PI(S ∪ {v}, T ∪ {v}) = 1 if T = V \ {v}, and 0 otherwise, in which case we have PI(S ∪ {v}, T ∪ {v}) = PI(S, T ) + PI(S, T ∪ {v}). If S ⊇ R, then PI(S ∪ {v}, T ∪ {v}) = 1 if T = S, and 0 otherwise, in which case again we have PI(S ∪ {v}, T ∪ {v}) = PI(S, T ) + PI(S, T ∪ {v}).
Therefore, v is a sink node. Then we can apply the Sink Node Axiom (Axiom 4) to iteratively remove all but the last node v ∈ R, such that the central measure of v does not change after the removal. It is easy to check by the definitions of projection and critical set instance that after the removal R is still the critical set for the instance. Thus we can apply Axiom 6' to the remaining influence instance after the removal, and know that the centrality measure of v is −1/(|R| + 1), that is, bR = −1/(|R| + 1). Therefore, aR = (|V | − |R|)/(|R|(|R| + 1)) is also uniquely determined, which means that the centrality measure ψ (IR) for instance IR is unique, for every nonempty subset R.
Now by the Spread Determination Axiom (Axiom 7), we know that ψ (I) is fully determined by the influence spread σI. Let σ I (S) = σI(S) − |S| for every subset S ⊆ V . Since σI and σ I have one-to-one correspondence, we also know that ψ (I) is fully determined by σ I . Therefore, we can also view ψ as a mapping from function σ I to R |V | . For each function σ I , we can view it as a vector of dimension 2 |V | − 2, which specifies for each S ⊂ V with S ∈ {∅, V }, the value σ I (S). Note that σ I (∅) = σ I (V ) = 0, so we do not need to specify the values for S ∈ {∅, V }. Next we consider instance IR defined above with critical set R. We show that all σ I R functions (treated as vectors) with R ∈ {∅, V } are linearly independent in the space R Suppose that they are not linearly independent. Then for each such R, we have a number αR ∈ R, such that R ∈{∅,V } αRσ I R = 0, and at least some αR = 0. Let S be the smallest set with αS = 0. Consider any set R with |R| ≥ |S| and R = S. We have that S ⊇ R, and thus by the critical set definition PI(S, S) = 1. This implies that σ I R (S) = σI R (S) − |S| = |S| − |S| = 0. By the definition of S, we also know for any R with |R| < |S|, αR = 0. Therefore, we have 0 = R ∈{∅,V } αRσ I R (S) = αSσ I S (S). Finally, since S ∈ {∅, V } and S is the critical set in IS, we have σ I S (S) = σI S (S) − |S| = |V | − |S| > 0. Thus we obtain that αS = 0, a contradiction. Therefore, vectors {σ I R } R ∈{∅,V } are linearly independent.
Let the null influence instance I N to be the instance in which no seed set has any influence except to itself, that is, For any S ⊆ V , P I N (S, S) = 1. Since every node in I With the above preparation, we can use the Bayesian Axiom (Axiom 5) and Lemma 23 to argue that for any influence instance I, if σ I = R⊆V,R ∈{∅,V } λR · σ I R , then ψ (σ I ) = R⊆V,R ∈{∅,V } λR · ψ (σ I R ), where we identify notation ψ (σ I ) with ψ (I). Since we have argued above that ψ (IR) are uniquely determined for all R ∈ {∅, V }, we know that ψ (I) is uniquely determined.
Theorem 4. The Shapley centrality ψ * is the unique centrality measure that satisfies axiom set Aσ (Axioms 1, 2, 4 -7).
Proof. This is directly implied by Lemmas 18, 26, and 28 , and the trivial fact that ψ * satisfies Axiom 7. for every u ∈ R, estu = estu + 1/|R(v w )| 10: end for 11: for every v ∈ V ,φ v = n · estv/θ 12: returnφ v , v ∈ V Algorithm 2: ASV-RR-W: Approximate Shapley value computation of weighted social influence based on reverse reachable sets, for the triggering model.
E. EXTENSION TO WEIGHTED INFLU-ENCE MODEL
In this section, we extend the study of influence model and influence spread functions in the weighted case. Intuitively, different nodes have different importance when activated, and we use a weight function to represent node importance. Let w : V → R be a weight function on the nodes, such that w(v) ≥ 0, and v∈V w(v) = |V |. For any subset S ⊆ V , we use w(S) to denote v∈S w(v). We can extend the cardinality based influence spread σ(S) to weighted influence spread σ w (S) = E[w(I(S))], that is, the influence spread is weighted based on the importance of activated nodes in I(S). Note that in the equivalent live-edge graph model, we have σ w (S) = E L [w(R(L, S))]. Set function σ w (S) is still monotone and submodular.
E.1 Algorithm ASV-RR-W for Weighted Influence Spread
The ASV-RR algorithm can be extended to the weighted influence spread case. Algorithm 2 gives the pseudocode for our weighted ASV-RR-W algorithm, which is simple generalization of unweighted ASV-RR. We call the randomly selected node v that starts the generation of the RR set as the root node, and use R(v) to denote the random RR set generated from root v. We use v w to denote the random node drawn proportionally to weight w(v w ). The main change from ASV-RR is now we sample random RR sets according the weight of the root node. We also added the maximum node weight w * in the estimation of θ in line 4. Theorem 1 remains essentially the same, except that we replace the unweighted σ * 1 with the weighted version σ w, * 1
